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Galileo and the Scientific Revolution: The Importance of His Kinematics 
[Galilaeana, 8 (2011), pp. 3-36.] 
 
If asked to sum up Galileo’s contribution to the Scientific Revolution, a historian of science 
might still wish to stipulate Galileo’s experimental method, even though the extent to which 
he relied upon experimental evidence was challenged by his great admirer Marin Mersenne, 
and was effectively denied by Raffaello Caverni, and of course Alexandre Koyré.
1
 
Alternatively, our historian might see it as a safer bet to extol his contribution to the 
«mathematization of the world picture». Regardless of arguments about whether Galileo 
should be seen as a Platonist or an Archimedean, there can be no denying that, by showing 
how mathematics can be used to reveal real truths about the physical world, Galileo was one 
of the greatest of those early modern thinkers who removed the traditional barrier, maintained 
by scholastic Aristotelians, between a natural philosophy supposedly based on physical 
causes, and a mathematics that was seen as merely instrumental.
2
 If anyone deserved to be 
seen as both mathematician and natural philosopher, it was Galileo.  
 
Another way to sum up Galileo’s contribution to the Scientific Revolution is simply to focus 
on those of Galileo’s discoveries which we still uphold today: his various astronomical 
observations, the law of free fall, the isochronism of the pendulum, the parabolic trajectory of 
projectiles, and other details of his new science of motion. After all, Galileo was no 
systematist. As Descartes pointed out to Mersenne, on first reading the Discorsi in 1639, «he 
has not investigated matters in an orderly way, and has merely sought explanations for some 
                                                 
1 For a fuller discussion of critical assessments of Galileo’s experimentalist credentials see MICHAEL SEGRE, In 
the Wake of Galileo, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1991, pp. 44-49. 
2 There is a still growing body of scholarship on the rise in status of mathematicians and mathematics in the late 
renaissance and early modern period. It began with ROBERT S. WESTMAN, The Astronomer’s Role in the 
Sixteenth Century: A Preliminary Survey, «History of Science», 18, 105-47; but see also, for example, ANNA DE 
PACE, Le matematiche e il mondo, Milan: Franco Angeli , 1993; and  PETER DEAR, Discipline and Experience: 
The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
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particular effects...»
3
  It might even be argued that this is the best that can be said in favour of 
Galileo: his importance lay not in establishing a new way of philosophizing but in producing 
a range of new observations and new arguments which pointed the way to a new philosophy, 
and enabled others to accomplish it. 
 
It seems to me, however, that there is another way to sum up Galileo’s importance in the 
history of science. I want to suggest that Galileo’s significance for the Scientific Revolution 
rests upon something as wide ranging and expansive as the experimental method or the 
mathematization of the world picture but which, as far as I know, has not yet been properly 
acknowledged by Galileo scholars, although it is certainly implicit in many of their 
commentaries. What I have in mind might be referred to as «Galileo’s science of motion», 
but by this, I do not simply mean the «new science» of motion which he expounded in the 
Discorsi. Galileo was one of the seminal figures of the Scientific Revolution, I want to 
suggest, because he clearly showed his contemporaries how all physical phenomena might be 
explained in terms of bodies in motion, and nothing more.
4
 At a time when the learned all 
over Europe were recognising that Aristotelianism could no longer be sustained, it became 
increasingly urgent to establish a new physics on new principles. Although Galileo never 
succeeded in writing his book on the System of the World which he announces as forthcoming 
in his Siderius Nuncius,
5
 his Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del Mondo, supplemented 
                                                 
3 Descartes to Mersenne, 11 October 1638. C. ADAM and P. TANNERY (eds), Oeuvres de Descartes, 12 vols, 
Paris, Vrin, 1964-1976, vol. II, p. 380. 
4 When I say this has not yet been properly acknowledged by Galileo scholars, I am not disregarding the wealth 
of important work on Galileo’s «new science» of motion. It seems to me, however, that the focus of this work 
has tended to be the technical details of Galileo’s theory of motion. For an excellent recent example see CARLA 
RITA PALMERINO and J. M. M. H. THIJSSEN (eds), The Reception of Galilean Science of Motion in Seventeenth 
Century Europe, Dordrecht, Springer, 2004. My concern, unlike those of the authors in this collection, is with 
the wider ethos of Galileo’s natural philosophy, which is to say his kinematic natural philosophy, in which 
motion is presented as the chief, if not the only, causative and explanatory feature of physical phenomena. 
5 In STILLMAN DRAKE’s edition of Sidereus Nuncius, in Disoveries and Opinions of Galileo, New York, 
Random House, 1957, this is mentioned by Galileo on pages 43, 45, and 58. Drake implies the book was 
intended simply to deal with Copernican theory, and suggests it eventually appeared, modified per force, as the 
Dialogo (note 14 on p. 43), but it is possible that at this point Galileo envisaged something closer to a complete 
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by other mature works, including of course the Discorsi, demonstrated sufficiently clearly 
how everything in the physical world could be explained by recourse to nothing more 
mysterious than motion. As Thomas Hobbes wrote, «Galileus in our time... was the first that 
opened to us the gate of natural philosophy universal, which is the knowledge of the nature of 
‘motion’. So that neither can the age of natural philosophy be reckoned higher than to him.» 
Galileo’s science of motion was seen as a «natural philosophy universal».6 
 
Galileo was not, of course, unique in seeing the importance of kinematics as all that was 
required to replace Aristotelian natural philosophy. Some contemporary mathematicians may 
well have foreshadowed him, as well as the early self-styled physico-mathematical 
philosopher Isaac Beeckmann, and Descartes certainly outstripped him by producing the first 
fully developed system of kinematic natural philosophy in his Le monde, virtually complete 
when Galileo’s Dialogo emerged from the press.7 There can be no denying, however, that 
Galileo’s reputation was such that his ideas were keenly scrutinised by contemporary 
thinkers. Descartes suppressed Le monde (as a result of Galileo’s condemnation) and by the 
time the fuller exposition of his system, Principia philosophiae, appeared in print in 1644, 
most of its readers would already have been prepared for Descartes’s unyieldingly kinematic 
approach by Galileo’s theory of the tides and other aspects of the Dialogo and the Discorsi.   
 
I will examine the development of Galileo’s kinematics in due course, but before that we 
should consider the context within which Galileo first presented it. In order to understand the 
contemporary appeal of kinematics to natural philosophers who were unused to the kind of 
                                                                                                                                                        
system of philosophy, comparable to Descartes’s Le monde. For a fuller discussion of this work see DRAKE, 
Galileo: Pioneer Scientist, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990, pp. 79-82. 
6 THOMAS HOBBES, Elements of philosophy, in English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, 11 vols, 
London, J. Bohn, 1839-1845, vol. I, pp. viii-ix. 
7 On Beeckman and Descartes see, for example, STEPHEN GAUKROGER, Descartes: An Intellectual Biography, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995. 
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mathematical approach presented by Galileo (especially in the Discorsi), we have to consider 
the alternatives. 
 
Alternatives to Aristotle: Renaissance Speculative Philosophies 
Even before 1543, when Copernicus showed (to those willing to listen) how wrong Ptolemy 
and Aristotle were about the nature of the world system, and Andreas Vesalius indicated that 
the medical authority figure, Galen, might also be badly mistaken, leading thinkers were 
already becoming increasingly aware that the closely interwoven traditional system of 
philosophy was so flawed as to be unsupportable. The recovery by Renaissance humanist 
scholars of Ancient alternatives to Aristotle made it clear that il maestro di color che sanno 
was only one among several, and for many Ancient thinkers he was far from being supreme. 
A resulting tendency among the learned, if not to reject authority tout court but at least to 
treat it more circumspectly, led to a new emphasis on observation and experience—an 
emphasis which was heightened by information brought back from the voyages of discovery 
and the New World.
8
 
 
One of the most impressive aspects of the Medieval World view was that it was all of a 
piece—although it was always possible to argue about seeming contradictions or 
inconsistencies here and there, for the most part it was an entire system of philosophy, 
comprehensive in scope, and capable at least in principle of explaining all phenomena. As 
soon as this edifice began to crumble, therefore, it seemed important to replace it with a 
similar all-encompassing system. When Vesalius showed that there were no pores in the 
septum dividing the right ventricle from the left ventricle of the heart, he revealed that the 
whole interconnected physiological system of Galen could not possibly be correct. It did not 
                                                 
8 See, for example, KLAUS A. VOGEL, Cosmography, in KATHERINE PARK and LORRAINE DASTON (eds), The 
Cambridge History of Science, Volume 3: Early Modern Science, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2006, pp. 469-96. 
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help to suggest, as Realdus Columbus did, that blood crossed from the right ventricle of the 
heart to the left via the lungs; and Harvey’s discovery in 1628 that the two separate systems 
of Galen, the venous and the arterial systems, were in fact one system allowing a continuous 
re-circulation of the blood, only confirmed that Galenism was thoroughly misconceived. But 
what was there to replace Galenism? Certainly Vesalius, Columbus and Harvey had nothing 
to put in its place. The first real attempt to provide the required complete system of 
physiology, and furthermore one which dovetailed seamlessly with a comprehensive system 
of natural philosophy (as Galen’s system of physiology had, closely enough, with Aristotleian 
natural philosophy) was offered in Descartes’s Traité de l’homme.9  
 
It was only in the Enlightenment that the impulse to provide a comprehensive system of 
philosophy was decried.
10
 Renaissance and early modern thinkers, used to the comprehensive 
system of scholastic Aristotelianism and its affiliates (most notably Ptolemaic astronomy and 
Galenic physiology), were still locked into the view that what was required, as 
Aristotelianism began to collapse, was an equally all-embracing system of philosophy. 
 
If we concentrate on reforming natural philosophers (as opposed to elite mathematical 
practitioners, among whom we can include Galileo), it seems fair to say that they almost all 
looked to the occult as the most likely source for the required new system of philosophy. 
Occult qualities had long been invoked by scholastic philosophers to explain the behaviour of 
bodies which could not be explained in terms of the so-called manifest qualities of heat, 
coldness, dryness and wetness. As Aristotleianism increasingly failed to account for new 
observations and experiences, occult qualities were resorted to more and more frequently. It 
                                                 
9 See, for example, ROGER FRENCH, William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1994; and ROBERT G. FRANK, Harvey and the Oxford Physiologists, Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1980. Descartes’s Traité de l’homme was the second part of Le monde and was not published until 1662. 
10 Voltaire and the editors of the Encyclopédie, Denis Diderot and Jean d’Alembert, for example, began to 
dismiss Descartes as a builder of romances who was foolishly enthralled by l’esprit de système. 
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must have seemed a small step from here to supposing that the occult qualities which had 
never been properly discussed, much less explored, by scholastic philosophers perhaps held 
the key to reforming natural philosophy. Moreover, the re-discovery of the quasi-religious 
writings attributed to the author already associated with a diffuse body of magical writings, 
Hermes Trismegistus, led to the belief that Hermes was an Ancient sage who not only 
promoted the occult but also prefigured Christian doctrines such as the Trinity, the 
immortality of the soul, and so forth.
11
 
 
Marsilio Ficino was, of course, immensely influential in the new movement to develop a new 
comprehensive system of philosophy. His own occultism in many ways set the trend, 
subsequent thinkers taking up different features of his philosophy and developing it in varied 
ways.
12
 One of the earliest of these would-be systems, and one which became influential in 
its own right, was presented by Jean Fernel in his De abditis rerum causis (1548). The hidden 
causes of things, according to Fernel, all seemed to derive in some way from the stars.
13
 
Similarly, Girolamo Fracastoro, took as his starting point the old occult belief in sympathies, 
De sympathia et antipathia rerum (1546). Girolamo Cardano’s De subtilitate (1550), and his 
De varietate rerum (1557) do not seem to provide a coherent philosophical system, but are 
rather compendia illustrating that there are, as Hamlet believed, «more things under heaven 
and earth... than are dreamt of in your philosophy». There is no denying, however, that the 
overall impression is that occult traditions have much to offer.
14
 Bernardino Telesio’s De 
rerum natura iuxta propria principia (1587) assumed that all things are sentient and relied 
                                                 
11 BRIAN COPENHAVER, Hermetica, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992. 
12 See, for example, MICHAEL J.B. ALLEN, and VALERY REES, with MARTIN DAVIES (eds), Marsilio Ficino: His 
Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy, Leiden, Brill, 2002; and HIRO HIRAI, Le concept de semence dans les 
théories de la matière à la Renaissance de Marsile Ficin à Pierre Gassendi, Turnhout, Brepols, 2005. 
13 JOHN M. FORRESTER AND JOHN HENRY, Jean Fernel’s On the Hidden Causes of Things: Forms, Souls, and 
Occult Diseases in Renaissance Medicine, Leiden, Brill, 2005. 
14 GIROLAMO CARDANO, De subtilitate libri XXI, Paris, 1550; De rerum varietate libri XVII, Basel, 1557. 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, Hamlet, Act I, Scene 5, ll. 166-7.  
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heavily on ideas of spirit which derive from the earlier magical philosophy of Ficino.
15
 
Furthermore, Telesio was a major influence on at least two other thinkers who were indebted 
to the magical tradition, Tommaso Campanella, author of De sensu rerum et magia (1620) 
and other magical works, and Francis Bacon, whose own system of philosophy, combined 
Telesian ideas on spirit with alchemical ideas to make what has been described as a semi-
Paracelsian cosmology.
16
 The inventive group of Italian system-building «nature 
philosophers», as they are usually known, also included alongside Telesio and Campanella, 
Francesco Patrizi, and Giordano Bruno. The magical nature of Bruno’s world-view is well 
known, but Patrizi’s views are indicated, if not by the title of his great system, Nova de 
universis philosophia (1593) then by the fact that he published it alongside his own 
translation of Chaldean and Hermetic works, under the title Magia philosophia (1593). We 
can add to these thinkers, more overtly magical thinkers, such as Giambattista della Porta and 
Cornelius Agrippa, and of course Paracelsus and his numerous followers.
17
  
 
Although each of these had their followers, and some were extremely influential, for us, 
reading them today, they offer nothing that helps us to really understand the physical world. 
Indeed, it is very difficult for us to imagine that they did anything but hinder progress in 
scientific understanding. Giordano Bruno, who still commands huge amounts of scholarly 
attention, was clearly a confused and undisciplined thinker whose inability to recognise a non 
                                                 
15 BERNARDINO TELESIO, De Rerum Natura iuxta propria principia Libri IX. Naples, 1586. See also Nicola 
Abbagnano, Bernardino Telesio e la filosofia del Rinascimento italiano, Milan, 1941. 
16 GERMANA ERNST, Tommaso Campanella: The Book and the Body of Nature, Dordrecht, Springer, 2010. 
GRAHAM REES, Bacon's speculative philosophy, in MARKKU PELTONEN (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Bacon, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996. The classic account of magic in the philosophy of Bacon 
is, of course, PAOLO ROSSI, Francesco Bacone: dalla magia alla scienza, Bari, Laterza, 1957.  
17 P. CASTELLI (ed.), Francesco Patrizi filosofo platonico nel crepuscolo del Rinascimento, Florence, Olschki, 
2002; LUISA MURARO VAIANI, Giambattista della Porta mago e scienziato, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1978; PAOLA 
ZAMBELLI, Magic and Radical Reformation in Agrippa of Nettesheim, «Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld 
Institutes», 39, 1976, pp. 69–103; CHRISTOPHER I. LEHRICH, The Language of Demons and Angels: Cornelius 
Agrippa's Occult Philosophy, Leiden, Brill, 2003; WALTER PAGEL, Paracelsus: An Introduction to 
Philosophical Medicine in the Era of the Renaissance, New York, Karger, 1958; and JOLE SHACKELFORD, A 
Philosophical Path for Paracelsian Medicine: The Ideas, Intellectual Context, and Influence of Petrus Severinus 
(1540/2-1602), Copenhagen, The Danish National Library of Science and Medicine, 2004. 
 8 
sequitur was only matched by his propensity for depending upon them.
18
 William Harvey, all 
too often mistakenly seen as a «modern» thinker who first saw the heart merely as a pump, 
was in fact a vitalist thinker, led at least in part by his admiration for Fernel, to believe that 
the blood was inherently alive because it «corresponds to the element of the stars.»
19
 
Although we can see the links between Harvey’s belief and Fernel’s De abditis rerum causis, 
we are hard pressed to understand what they really meant by this kind of talk, and why they 
felt it was useful.
20
 And yet Fernel and Harvey are among the most down-to-earth of the 
thinkers mentioned in the previous paragraph. It would be easy to imagine them both 
rejecting the ideas of other occult philosophers. Indeed, Harvey was known to have had 
nothing but contempt for Paracelsians. 
 
Francis Bacon, likewise, despised Paracelsus as a promoter of «detestable falsehoods» and 
«empty delusions». He was willing to make an exception in the case of the Danish 
Paracelsian Petrus Severinus, however, whom he saw as «a man too good to die in the toils of 
such folly.»
21
 And yet, when we read Severinus today, although we can acknowledge that his 
presentation seems more systematic than most Paracelsians, it remains bafflingly unhelpful as 
a way of understanding the world. It might be suggested, in defence of Severinus, that this is 
simply because we are too far removed from Severinus historically—and that because of that 
our mind-sets are too different. But such a suggestion does not capture why we are baffled by 
Severinus. We can, after all, read Aristotle, or a medieval scholastic, and have no trouble 
                                                 
18 I am not the only one to have recognised Bruno’s inability to offer a cogent argument. For a brief survey of 
earlier scholars exasperated by Bruno see JOHN HENRY, Thomas Harriot and Atomism: A Reappraisal, «History 
of Science», 20, 1982, pp. 267-96. 
19 WILLIAM HARVEY, Disputations touching the Generation of Animals, translated by GWENETH WHITTERIDGE, 
Oxford, Blackwell Scientific publications, 1981, p. 378. Cf. FORRESTER and HENRY, Jean Fernel’s On the 
Hidden Causes of Things (cit. note 13), pp. 34-5. 
20 HIRAI, Le concept de semence (cit. note 12); and JAMES J. BONO, Renaissance Theoretical Medicine: Harvey 
versus Fernel, «Journal of the History of Biology», 23, 1990, pp. 341-87. 
21 FRANCIS BACON, The Masculine Birth of Time, in BENJAMIN FARRINGTON (ed.), The Philosophy of Francis 
Bacon, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 1964, pp. 66-7. For fuller discussion see SHACKELFORD, A 
Philosophical Path for Paracelsian Medicine (cit. note 17), pp. 257-64. 
 9 
seeing why claims of theirs which we know to be wrong might have been accepted by 
contemporaries as both persuasive and helpful (take the Aristotelian claim, for example, that 
a heavy body falls faster than a light one). Severinus’s philosophy is just too fanciful, too 
wilfully and self-referentially convoluted, for us to feel that there is anything reliable in its 
account of the world. Although Bacon evidently had a grudging admiration for Severinus, it 
would be easy to imagine another contemporary (and not just a Mersenne, a Galileo, or a 
Descartes) dismissing it as incoherent nonsense. 
 
It is clear, anyway, that not one among these innovatory thinkers managed to convince the 
majority of learned men throughout Europe that they had a philosophy which could replace 
Aristotelianism, lock, stock, and barrel. Nevertheless, taken together, it is clear that they were 
highly influential. What this collective influence shows, however, is not that there was 
something in these philosophies, but that the pressing need for some substitute for 
Aristotelianism was widely recognised. Furthermore, the fact that virtually all of these 
alternatives were based to a greater or lesser extent on occult notions, provides further 
testimony to the separation, throughout this period, between natural philosophy and 
mathematics. So great was this separation that when early modern thinkers began to look for 
new sources for a reformed natural philosophy, natural philosophers did not think to look to 
mathematics, as we with hindsight might have expected them to do, but turned more readily 
to the occult.
22
 
 
It is my contention, however, that the proliferation of speculative occult philosophies 
throughout the sixteenth century and into the seventeenth was another factor enabling 
mathematicians to make greater claims for the usefulness of mathematics and therefore for 
                                                 
22 I have discussed this in more detail in JOHN HENRY, The Origins of the Experimental Method—Mathematics 
or Magic? in HUBERTUS BUSCHE and STEFAN HESSBRUEGGEN-WALTER (eds), Departure to Modern Europe: 
Philosophy between 1400 and 1700 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2010). 
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their own status in the intellectual and social hierarchies of late Renaissance Europe.
23
 Seeing 
the lack of success of the various occult philosophies, but recognising the pressing need for a 
new system of philosophy to replace Aristotelianism, some of the most ambitious 
mathematicians saw their chance to show how their mathematical approach could, in spite of 
scholastic prejudice against the usefulness of mathematics, provide persuasive accounts of 
how the world worked. I believe that Galileo was the mathematician who first saw that his 
mathematical studies could be turned into a new kind of natural philosophy, and one which, 
presented in the right way, could explain natural phenomena in a way which was immediately 
intelligible. Galileo’s mathematical studies of motion, highly specific and seemingly limited 
in scope at first—mathematics written for mathematicians—at some point came to be seen by 
him in a more expansive way. Mathematics, he began to think, could be written for natural 
philosophers and used as the basis for a System of the World. Galileo the natural philosopher 
came to believe, perhaps as a result of seeing a way to explain the tides, that he could explain 
all physical phenomena without recourse to the occult, indeed without recourse to anything 
more mysterious than bodies in motion. 
 
Galileo against the Occult: Denying Forces 
I believe the background I have just sketched, showing the proliferation of occult 
philosophies throughout the sixteenth century, is a major reason why Galileo became so 
vehemently opposed to the occult. Just as Galileo tried to promote Copernicanism not only by 
providing evidence and arguments in its favour, but also by dismissing arguments against it; 
so he tried to promote his own mathematically-inspired  philosophy not only by arguments in 
its support, but also by exposing the inadequacies of any occult approach. Before looking at 
                                                 
23 The rise in status of mathematical practitioners has been a prominent feature of the literature on early modern 
science in recent years. See note 2 above, but see also, Mario Biagioli, The Social Status of Italian 
Mathematicians, 1450-1600, «History of Science», 27, 1989, pp. 41-95; and G. C. Giacobbe, Il commentarium 
de certitudine mathematicarum disciplinarum di Alessandro Piccolomini, «Physis», 14, 1972, pp. 5-40. 
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this in detail, however, it is perhaps worth considering suggestions that early in his career 
even Galileo might have thought that the occult offered the best chance to find a replacement 
system of natural philosophy.  
 
The obvious starting point is astrology. It seems hard to believe that Galileo ever took 
astrology seriously and it is tempting to suppose, therefore, that the horoscopes he cast were 
done simply because he was commissioned to draw them up. Even those he cast for his own 
children may have been done at the importuning of Maria, their mother. And yet, it is now 
clear that the first time the Church authorities took notice of Galileo it included the issue as to 
whether he was an astrological determinist. An amanuensis to Galileo, Silvestro Pagnoni, 
testified to the local Inquisition at Padua in 1604 that Galileo declared the predictions based 
on his nativities to be «certain». The charge was not pursued and so it is possible that there is 
no truth in it, but given that there is no smoke without fire, it remains puzzling.
24
 Galileo was 
such a robust thinker that one cannot help feeling that if he were to believe in astrology, he 
would want to insist that it was deterministic!—but did he, could he, believe in astrology?25 
Galileo again seems to speak positively about astrological influence in a letter he wrote to his 
supporter Piero Dini in 1611. Dini had asked Galileo what purpose was served by the stars 
which Galileo had seen through the telescope but which were invisible to the naked eye. 
Galileo replied that 
if the stars do operate and influence principally by their light, perchance it might be 
possible with some probable conjecture to deduce courage and boldness of heart from 
                                                 
24 ANTONINO POPPI, Cremonini e Galilei Inquisiti a Padova nel 1604, Padua, Antenore, 1993, p. 54. 
25 The standard line among astrologers, of course, was that the stars impel but do not compel (stellae non 
cogunt, agunt). 
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very large and vehement stars, and acuteness and perspicacity of wit from the thinnest 
and almost invisible lights.
26
 
It may be, however, that Galileo simply did not think the occasion of this letter was the time 
or the place to dismiss astrology—he might have known, for example, that to do so would 
merely upset Dini. 
 
Whatever the situation earlier in his career, however, we can now be reasonably certain that 
by the time he came to publish the Dialogo Galileo did not believe in astrology. As well as 
the famous rejection of astrology in the Dialogo itself, we now have the testimony of Ascanio 
Piccolomini, the archbishop of Siena who took Galileo into his home immediately after his 
condemnation. In a recently discovered letter of September 1633 to his brother, Ottavio, the 
archbishop wrote of his own newly inspired rejection of astrology: 
I have largely lost credence since learning that Messr. Galileo, famed as an Astrologer 
and still my guest after two months, derides it entirely, and makes fun of it as a 
profession founded on the most uncertain, if not false, foundations.
27
 
 
So much for astrology, but there is a slightly different aspect of heavenly influence we also 
need to consider. There seems to be an indication that even as late as 1615 Galileo was 
willing to countenance some kind of heavenly influence capable of acting at a distance. 
Although, once again, it is difficult to be sure what to make of this pronouncement—it might 
have been said, insincerely, merely for effect. It occurs towards the end of the Letter to the 
                                                 
26 Galileo to Piero Dini, 21 May 1611. For a fuller consideration of Galileo and astrology see Nicholas Campion 
and Nick Kollerstrom (eds), Galileo’s Astrology, a special issue of «Culture and Cosmos», 7 (2003). The letter 
to Dini is discussed pp. 85-95. 
27 Ascanio Piccolomini to Ottavio Piccolomini, 22 September, 1633; quoted from MASSIMO BUCCIANTINI and 
MICHELE CAMEROTA, Once More about Galileo and Astrology: A Neglected Testimony, «Galilaeana», 2, 2005, 
pp. 229-231, p.231. I am very grateful to Professor Franco Giudice for bringing this to my attention. See also 
GALILEO GALILEI, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, translated by STILLMAN DRAKE, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967, pp. 109-10 (OG, VII, pp.135-6). 
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Grand Duchess Christina, when Galileo is trying to show that the famous Biblical passage in 
which Joshua commands the Sun to stand still actually fits the Copernican scheme more 
readily than the Ptolemaic: 
if we consider the nobility of the sun, and the fact that it is the font of light which (as I 
shall conclusively prove) illuminates not only the moon and the earth but all other 
planets, which are inherently dark, then I believe that it will not be entirely 
unphilosophical to say that the sun, as the chief minister of Nature and in a certain 
sense the heart and soul of the universe, infuses by its own rotation not only light but 
also motion into other bodies which surround it. And just as if the motion of the heart 
should cease in an animal, all other motions of its members would also cease, so if the 
rotation of the sun were to stop, the rotations of all the planets would stop too.
28
 
Galileo seems to have borrowed this idea from Kepler’s Astronomia nova (1609) but he does 
not support it by reference to Kepler but by reference to «the blessed Dionysius the 
Areopagite in his book Of the Divine Names».
29
 After two long quotations from Pseudo-
Dionysius, Galileo feels justified in concluding: «The sun, then, being the font of light and 
the source of motion... »
30
 Wilbur Applebaum and Renzo Baldasso have taken this passage to 
indicate Galileo’s acceptance of Kepler’s view, but I remain sceptical.31 It seems to me that 
Galileo was ingenious enough to notice how Kepler’s view dovetailed nicely with that of the 
«blessed Dionysius» and may have appropriated Kepler’s view simply to provide him with 
the occasion of introducing Dionysius into the proceedings. If so, we cannot be confident that 
Galileo actually believed the Keplerian account, depending as it does upon the supremely 
occult notion of action at a distance.  
                                                 
28 In DRAKE (ed.), Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo (cit. note 5), pp. 212-3. 
29 Now attributed, of course, to Pseudo-Dionysius. 
30 In DRAKE (ed.), Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo (cit. note 5), pp. 213. 
31 WILBUR APPLEBAUM and RENZO BALDASSO, Galileo and Kepler on the Sun as Planetary Mover, in JOSE 
MONTESINOS and CARLOS SOLIS (eds), Largo campo di filosofare: Eurosymposium Galileo 2001, Las Palmas, 
Fundacion Canaria Orotava de Historia de la Ciencia, 2001, pp. 381-90.  
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Astrology and the use of Kepler’s idea of the sun as the motor of the planetary system are, as 
far as I know, the only two aspects of Galileo’s philosophy which might be construed as 
occultist. It is impossible to be certain what to make of either of them, but I hope I have said 
enough to suggest that we might be making a serious mistake if we took either of these at 
face value. The balance of the evidence with regard to both astrology, and the movement of 
the planets, is that he did not believe in an occult influence from the heavens, or from 
heavenly bodies such as the Sun. Certainly, as we shall now see, in every other aspect of his 
work, Galileo took great pains to eschew any suggestion of occult influence. 
 
The most obvious and unremitting way in which Galileo denies the occult in his work is by 
denying the validity of notions of force. It is generally acknowledged that Galileo tried as 
much as possible to avoid the use of, or even discussions of, force in his natural philosophy. 
Instead, he tried to develop a physics based upon the causal action of moving bodies, or upon 
the tendencies of bodies to move. So, although he spoke of force of impact, or force of 
percussion, and other commonplace notions of force, such as the force required to depress a 
lever, he avoided talking in terms (familiar elsewhere) of forces as agents which can be 
disseminated in a sphere of influence or sphere of activity around a non-moving body, or 
which are capable of acting at a distance. I will say more about these and other similar 
notions of force later, but for now let me say that this is the kind of force we are concerned 
with here. So when I say Galileo rejects the notion of force, I do not mean to say that he 
rejected notions of force of impact and the like, I mean that he rejected notions of force which 
seem to imply that forces have a real and separate existence of their own.  
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According to Stillman Drake, Galileo abandoned the notion of force as a cause of motion in 
1598 «and never returned to it».
32
 Drake even went so far as to suggest that the most 
revolutionary aspect of Galileo’s physics was the fact that it was based on a rejection of 
«causal enquiries», and it seems that what he meant by this was simply that Galileo rejected 
the notion of force, and developed a «kinematics without any trace of dynamics». So, when 
Drake wrote of Galileo’s «rejection of the quest for causes in physics», he had in mind 
Galileo’s rejection of the explanatory use of force. 33 
 
Drake expressed his surprise at Galileo’s approach because, as he himself said, «so deeply 
ingrained is the notion that little can be done in physics except by dynamics».
34
 It seems 
abundantly clear, nonetheless, that Galileo did insist upon developing a kinematic physics 
and deliberately avoided any recourse to notions of forces in his physical explanations. What 
is far from clear, however, is why this was so. Little or no attention has been paid by scholars 
to the reasons for this avoidance of the notion of force. Why was Galileo so concerned to 
eschew the use of force? Surely this is a question which demands attention. Galileo evidently 
believed that a kinematic physics was entirely possible. But the question remains, why was 
this so important to him? Why was it that he preferred to reject the easily available notion of 
force and to try to proceed without it, even to the detriment of his physics?
35
 
 
I believe the answer to this question is very simple, even very obvious. Indeed, perhaps so 
obvious that nobody has bothered to examine it before. It seems to me, however, that just 
                                                 
32 DRAKE, Galileo: Pioneer Scientist (cit. note 5), p. 221. 
33 STILLMAN DRAKE, Cause, Experiment and Science, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1981. DRAKE, 
Galileo: Pioneer Scientist (cit. note 5), p. 197. DRAKE, Galileo Studies: Personality, Tradition, and Revolution, 
Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1970, p. 277. 
34 DRAKE, Galileo: Pioneer Scientist (cit. note 5), p. 199. 
35 That it was to the detriment of his physics has been asserted by R. S. WESTFALL, Force in Newton’s Physics: 
The Science of Dynamics in the Seventeenth Century, London, Macdonald, 1971, p. 88. This is quoted in full 
below at note 61. 
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because something is obvious, this does not mean that there is nothing to be learned from 
paying careful attention to it. The simple answer is that force was seen, in the early decades 
of the seventeenth century, as an occult notion, associated with active principles, vital spirits 
and other mysterious or inexplicable elements in Renaissance philosophy. It was the very fact 
that Galileo believed he could explain all phenomena in terms of motion, that made it 
important for him to expunge any suggestions that mysterious forces might be at work.  
 
As far as I am aware only Max Jammer’s study of Concepts of Force (1957) considers the 
occult aspects of the history of the notion of force, and he does so only briefly.
36
 Although R. 
S. Westfall’s magnificent Force in Newton’s Physics (1971) looks back to the notion of force 
before Isaac Newton, it begins with Galileo and Descartes, saying nothing about previous 
developments which might have led both of them to reject force. There is the same lack of 
concern with anything before the advent of the great figures of the Scientific Revolution in all 
other discussions of force and dynamics. The history of ideas about force before Galileo, 
therefore, seems to me to remain an important desideratum for future historical research. 
 
Force, in the sense which interests us here, was clearly not an Aristotelian concept. Aristotle 
believed that everything which moves must be (continually) moved by something else, and 
whatever does the moving must be in contact with the thing it moves (either by pushing or 
pulling, or, in the case of self-movers, by an internal act of the will). The new theories of 
force of impact or force of percussion which Galileo and others were introducing into the 
newly expanded science of mechanics would not have been seen as a radical departure from, 
                                                 
36 MAX JAMMER, Concepts of Force: A Study in the Foundations of Dynamics, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1957, pp. 53-80. 
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or in any way incompatible with, these Aristotelian precepts, but these were not the theories 
of force that interest us.
37
 
 
We are concerned here with what could be called occult notions of force. So far, there has 
been no systematic survey of ideas about these kinds of forces. Clearly, such a survey would 
include theories of attractive (or repulsive) force such as the magnetic and electric forces, the 
force of gravity, and other occult phenomena which seemed to suggest the possibility of actio 
in distans.
38
 These often seemed to be linked to the broader magical belief in sympathies and 
antipathies, which is to say the belief that there can be resonances and influences between 
different, but somehow corresponding, things in God’s Creation. A common assumption, 
underwriting astrology for example, was the belief that the heavenly bodies corresponded 
with and could influence sublunar phenomena. Theories invoked to explain such remote 
influences assumed that, as well as light, heavenly bodies might radiate other kinds of 
physical influence. Light itself, particularly in what is usually referred to as the tradition of 
light metaphysics, was often held to be capable of exerting pressure or in some way 
stimulating motion in bodies upon which it fell. This was a belief which seems to have 
derived from Neoplatonic ideas about the cosmogonical role of light. Emanating from the 
Godhead at the Creation, light was held to have diffused throughout space, in some versions 
constituting space as it went, and in others concreting itself to form the various bodies of the 
                                                 
37 On this aspect of Galileo’s work see, for example, PETER MACHAMER, Galileo’s Machines, His Mathematics, 
and His Experiments, in PETER MACHAMER (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Galileo, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 53-79. 
38 For a general survey see MARY B. HESSE, Forces and Fields: The Concept of Action at a Distance in the 
History of Physics, London, Nelson and Sons, 1961. STEPHEN PUMFREY, Magnetical Philosophy and 
Astronomy, 1600-1650, and J. A. BENNETT, Magnetical Philosophy and Astronomy from Wilkins to Hooke, both 
in, R. TATON and C. WILSON, eds, The General History of Astronomy, Volume 2A: Planetary Astronomy from 
the Renaissance to the Rise of Astrophysics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 45-53 and 222-
230; JOHN HENRY, Animism and Empricism: Copernican Physics and the Origins of William Gilbert’s 
Experimental Method, «Journal of the History of Ideas», 62, 2001, pp. 99-119; idem, Gravity and De 
gravitatione: The Development of Newton’s Ideas on Action at a Distance, «Studies in History and Philosophy 
of Science», 53, 2011; BRIAN P. COPENHAVER, A Tale of Two Fishes: Magical Objects in Natural History from 
Antiquity through the Scientific Revolution, «Journal of the History of Ideas» 52, 1991, pp. 373-98. 
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universe. In such emanationist traditions, often found in alchemical theorising, light was held 
to be a principle of activity within all bodies.
39
 A major representative of these ideas was 
pseudo-Dinoysius, whom we have just seen Galileo invoking at the end of his Letter to 
Christina.
40
 
 
This and closely related traditions which supposed other kinds of radiations emanating 
through the universe, gave rise in turn to the belief that created bodies might be endowed 
with their own spheres of activity or spheres of  virtue, demarcating a surrounding space 
through which the body might exert its influence in various ways, often either by attraction or 
repulsion. Theories of the multiplication of species, originally intended to comprehend the 
nature of radiating virtues within an Aristotelian framework, also offered ways of speculating 
about the means of transmission of active principles from one body to another without any 
transfer of matter.
41
 Similar ideas were often couched in terms of the activity of spirits, 
whether conceived as subtle material principles, or entirely immaterial entities, or beings held 
to have their own special ontological status forming a bridge between the material and the 
immaterial realms. Even when conceived as material entities, these putative spirits were 
considered to be active principles, capable for example of initiating motions in the 
surroundings. For the English physician, William Harvey, «spirit is that which Hippocrates 
                                                 
39 BRIAN COPENHAVER, Astrology and Magic, in C. B. SCHMITT and Q. SKINNER, eds, The Cambridge History of 
Renaissance Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 264-300; A. C. CROMBIE, Robert 
Grosseteste and the Origins of Modern Science, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1953;  BETTY JO TEETER DOBBS, The 
Janus Faces of Genius: The Role of Alchemy in Newton's Thought, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1991; JOHN HENRY, Magic and Science in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, in R. C. OLBY et al., eds, 
Companion to the History of Modern Science, London: Routledge, 1990, pp. 583-96; RON MILLEN, The 
Manifestation of Occult Qualities in the Scientific Revolution, in M. J. OSLER and P. L. FARBER, eds, Religion, 
Science and Worldview: Essays in Honor of Richard S. Westfall, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, 
pp. 185-216; JOHN HENRY, Occult Qualities and the Experimental Philosophy: Active Principles in pre-
Newtonian Matter Theory, «History of Science», 24, 1986, pp. 335-81; LYNN THORNDIKE, A History of Magic 
and Experimental Science, 8 vols, New York, Columbia University Press, 1923-58. 
40 I am committed to the view, of course, that Galileo drew upon pseudo-Dionysius in the Letter to Christina in 
an insincere way, simply to forward his cause. So, my comment here should not be taken to imply that Galileo 
approved of this Dionysian notion of force. 
41 See HENRY, Occult Qualities and the Experimental Philosophy (cit. note 39); idem, Robert Hooke, the 
Incongruous Mechanist, in MICHAEL HUNTER and SIMON SCHAFFER, eds, Robert Hooke: New Studies, 
Woodbridge, Boydell Press, 1989, pp. 149-80; and idem, Gravity and De gravitatione (cit. note 38). 
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called impetuum faciens, namely whatsoever attempts anything by its own endeavour and 
arouses any motion with agility and vehemence, or initiates any action».
42
 
 
Sources of information, or claims and speculations, about the nature of such emanations, 
multiplications, spirits, active principles, spheres of activity, and other ideas closely related 
to, or giving rise to, occult notions of force, can be seen to have originated from a number of 
different, though frequently overlapping, sources. Sympathies and antipathies and the notion 
of correspondences between different parts of Creation were mainstays of the Medieval 
natural magical tradition. The Galenic tradition in medicine developed ideas about occult 
qualities including attractions and repulsions. Newly revived Neoplatonic traditions, and 
recent eclectic attempts to develop new philosophies, such as those by Ficino, and the Italian 
Nature Philosophers, Telesio, Patrizi and Bruno, made intellectuals more aware of 
emanationist theories such as those of light metaphysics, while new alchemically inspired 
cosmologies like those of Paracelsus and Joan Baptista van Helmont combined emanationism 
with notions of active spirits.
43
 The theory of the multiplication of species was developed in 
the thirteenth century by Roger Bacon, renowned during the early modern period as one of 
the most noted magicians of his time. These theories had the powerful advantage among 
Renaissance thinkers of Ancient pedigrees, being found in Hermetic and other Neoplatonic 
writings which were supposed to reflect the oldest wisdom known to man.
44
 Even the 
                                                 
42 WILLIAM HARVEY, Disputations touching the Generation of Animals, translated by G. WHITTERIDGE, Oxford, 
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 20 
medieval theory of multiplication of species could be seen as a clarification of much older, 
Aristotelian ideas.
45
 In the case of light metaphysics, of course, it dovetailed perfectly with 
the Creation account in the book of Genesis in which God created the world by first creating 
light.
46
 
 
But these are just some of the more obvious ideas about occult forces and their most likely 
sources. What is required is a much more systematic survey of Medieval and Renaissance 
ideas, in order to draw up a much fuller catalogue of ideas on causative forces in pre-modern 
attempts to understand the natural world. The full picture will be much richer than this brief 
sketch. But even if there are no new elements in the full picture, even if my brief survey has 
touched upon all the relevant ideas, it seems to me that a full consideration of the history of 
these ideas will greatly enhance our understanding of the history of science. These are 
matters, then, that I hope will be fully explored in future. For the time being, however, it 
seems safe to say that there were numerous Renaissance and early modern thinkers who were 
clearly influenced by these occult notions of force.
47
  At a time when intellectuals assumed 
that real wisdom had been known in the past, and had been successively lost since the Fall of 
man, the Ancient pedigree of these ideas strongly suggested the truth of such notions.
48
 
Furthermore, there was nothing here that would have seemed inherently implausible and 
much that must have seemed potentially highly fruitful in understanding the operations of 
nature. Even so, it is very clear that not everyone agreed. In particular, it seems perfectly 
clear that all such ideas were anathema to Galileo. 
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For the most part Galileo manages to avoid discussing any such occult notions of force, 
preferring to stick to a usage of the term which clearly derives from the mathematical 
traditions of statics and mechanics. But he cannot avoid it when he comes to present his 
theory of the tides in the Fourth Day of the Dialogo. As is well known, it is at this point that 
Galileo publicly rebukes Kepler for perpetuating the view that the tides are caused by some 
kind of sympathetic attraction between the Moon and the waters of the seas. 
But, among all the great men who have philosophized about this remarkable effect, I 
am more astonished at Kepler than at any other. Despite his open and acute mind, and 
though he has at his fingertips the motions attributed to the earth, he has nevertheless 
lent his ear and his assent to the moon’s dominion over the waters, to occult 
properties, and to such puerilities.
 49
 
But this was by no means an original idea with Kepler, and I believe it is a sign of how 
important it was to Galileo to dismiss this occult notion that he mentioned Kepler by name 
He might have dismissed the notion in general terms, but since one of the leading 
astronomers of the day presented it favourably, Galileo felt the need to be explicit in his 
denunciation. Simplicio had already told readers, however, that those who refer the tides to 
the moon, «saying that this has a particular dominion over the waters», «are many», and he 
briefly mentioned one or two theories about the nature of that dominion, one being attraction, 
another being the ability to rarefy the waters by temperate heat.
50
 Interestingly, rejection of 
this occult influence of the Moon is an issue that unites all three of the interlocutors in the 
Dialogo. Sagredo interrupts Simplicio to say that it is a waste of time to relate these theories, 
and much more to bother to refute them, Salviati (representing Galileo) denies them, and 
Simplicio, for his part, doubts whether the true cause has yet been discovered.
51
  
 
                                                 
49 GALILEO, Dialogo (cit. note 27), p. 462. 
50 GALILEO, Dialogo (cit. note 27), p. 419. 
51 GALILEO, Dialogo (cit. note 27), p. 421. 
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But Simplicio goes on from here to say that the impossibility of explaining the tides in a way 
that is «conformable to natural matters» suggests that it is «a supernatural effect and, 
therefore, miraculous and unsearchable to the understandings of men». Sagredo points out 
that Simplicio is here taking the standard Aristotelian line since Aristotle «ascribes to 
miracles all things whose causes are hidden».
52
 Kepler and other occultist philosophers would 
have denied this suggestion, believing that it was possible for something to have occult, but 
nonetheless, natural (or secondary) causes. While Galileo, for his part, believed that he could 
use the motion of the Earth to show that the cause of the tides was neither miraculous nor 
occult. As far as he was concerned, his tidal theory not only provided evidence for the motion 
of the Earth (at least for Galileo), but it also explained how the tides should seem to depend 
upon the Sun and on the Moon without the Sun or Moon having «anything to do with oceans 
or with waters.» In other words, Galileo not only believed he could give a purely kinematic 
explanation of the tides, but also that this explanation could simultaneously explain why it 
might look to the unwary as though the Moon had an occult influence on the seas.
53
 
 
The latter aspect of his argument is complex and cannot be fully expounded here, but 
essentially it depends upon seeing the Moon’s rotation around the Earth as analogous to a 
regulating mechanism in a clock. Galileo describes the movement of weights of lead nearer 
or further from the pivot point of «a certain stick which is free to swing horizontally» which 
vary the frequency of the stick’s oscillations and so adjust the clock’s timekeeping. The 
motion of the Moon around the Earth inevitably brings it (the Moon) sometimes closer to the 
Sun and sometimes further away and this effects the motion of the Earth-Moon system as it 
revolves around the Sun, alternately slowing it down and speeding it up. These changes in the 
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Earth’s motion effect the motions of the waters, as can be seen in the rising and falling of the 
tides. In the end Salviati triumphantly declares: 
Now you see that the cause of the monthly period resides in the annual motion; and, 
withal, you see how much the moon is concerned in this business, and how it is 
therewith connected, without having anything to do with either seas or waters.
54
 
 
I believe that Galileo’s vigorous denunciation of Kepler and others who would explain the 
tides by occult attractions, and his own concern to reduce apparent occult interactions to a 
kinematic explanation analogous to motions in a clock, strongly suggests that his opposition 
to the use of force stemmed from its occult associations. This seems to be reinforced by the 
fact that he otherwise passes over notions of force in silence. His account of the Earth-Moon 
system as a regulating device which in turn effects the tides, and which we have just looked 
at, contains a number of references to «the force which moves the earth and the moon around 
the sun»,
55
 but this and other occasionally invoked «motive forces», as we’ve seen, are 
simply taken for granted and never discussed.  
 
The only exceptions to this that I am aware of look like attempts to suggest that the 
seemingly occult force of gravitational attraction might be reduced to nothing more than an 
impressed force or impetus, analogous to Galileo’s kinematic explanation of projectiles. 
Consider, for example, the discussion in the Dialogo following from Salviati’s famous claim 
that we know nothing of the essence of what we all know is «‘called’ gravity». Given our 
ignorance of the nature of gravity, it is perfectly possible that the internal principle of 
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downward movement exhibited during fall may be no different, Salviati argues, from the 
impetus which carries a projectile upwards. Impetus is imparted to a body by the act of 
projection so that the motion carries on after contact with the projector has ceased. 
Gravitational fall, Salviati suggests, may simply be caused by a downward impetus. The 
argument is taken no further and remains merely suggestive, but the clear implication seems 
to be that motion due to gravity might simply be the result of an impressed force somehow 
imparted kinematically to the falling body. Although Galileo admits that he does not fully 
understand the nature of impetus itself, he makes it clear that its mysteriousness lies in its 
status as an element in a moving body. In other words, how the impetus resides in the body 
and how it performs its function while it is there. There is no mystery, however, about how 
impetus is imparted to, or imposed upon, a body, since it is a purely kinematic process. Just 
as a lever may be moved by a man pushing or pulling on it, so a projectile can be given 
impetus by a man throwing it. If gravitational fall is the result of impetus, as Salviati is made 
to suggest, then it too would be produced kinematically.
56
  
 
Similarly, in the Discorsi when the interlocutors are made to bring attention to the cause of 
gravitational acceleration, they do so only to allow Salviati (and Galileo) to dismiss this as a 
futile endeavour: 
The present does not seem to be the proper time to investigate the cause of the 
acceleration of natural motion concerning which various opinions have been 
expressed by philosophers, some explaining it by attraction to the center, others to 
repulsion between the very small parts of the body, while still others attribute it to a 
certain stress in the surrounding medium which closes in behind the falling body and 
drives it from one of its positions to another. Now, all these fantasies, and others, too, 
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ought to be examined; but it is not really worthwhile. At present it is the purpose of 
our Author merely to investigate and to demonstrate some of the properties of 
accelerated motion (whatever the cause of this acceleration may be)...
57
 
 
It seems, then, that for the most part Galileo evaded consideration of forces in his physics; 
only occasionally, as in the case of the moon effecting the tides or acceleration due to gravity, 
would he confront the issue, and then merely in a highly speculative and inconclusive way. In 
these cases he made it clear that he dismissed occult views of force, and his speculations can 
be seen as hints as to how occult forces might be explained away. It is instructive in this 
regard to compare Galileo’s discussion of Gilbert’s magnetic theories with Kepler’s. Kepler 
makes full use of the cosmological, and occult, implications of Gilbert’s work, using 
magnetism as a cosmic force to prefigure Newtonian gravitation, and like Newtonian gravity 
capable of acting at a distance. Galileo, by contrast, merely acknowledges Gilbert’s proof that 
the Earth itself is a giant magnet, before focussing upon the use of armatures to increase the 
lifting powers of magnets.
58
 Once again, Galileo avoids any discussion of occult matters. 
Even his discussion of lifting by magnets describes touching the armatured magnet to an iron 
weight so that it can be lifted—there is no discussion, for example, of how large a weight can 
be made to leap up to a magnet held at a distance. Koyré suggested that Galileo did not 
embrace the cosmological aspects of Gilbert’s De magnete, in particular did not adapt it (as 
Kepler did) to explain gravitational phenomena, «because it was neither mathematical nor 
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even mathematisable.»
59
 It seems to me, however, that the occult nature of magnetism, and 
Gilbert’s account of it, was the real stumbling block.60 
 
For R. S. Westfall, Galileo’s refusal to allow forces of attraction was to prove highly 
detrimental to the development of science: 
…the mechanical philosophy sometimes functioned directly to obstruct the science of 
mechanics. The question of attraction summarises the problem. On the one hand, the 
mechanical philosophy hung the label «occult» on the very word «attraction» and 
refused to admit the concept into natural philosophy. On the other hand, the idea of 
attraction offered to mechanics the handiest vehicle to a consistent and simple 
conception of force, especially in the model of free fall. The dilemma that Galileo had 
faced, which made it impossible for him to see free fall as the paradigm case of 
dynamics, was generalised for the entire seventeenth century by the mechanical 
philosophy.
61
 
 
Although I am generally in agreement with what Westfall says here, I think it is important to 
avoid the assumption that the early mechanical philosophers, and especially Galileo, were 
‘misled’ or ‘mistaken’ in some way by refusing to accept the notion of attraction and other 
occult kinds of force. Westfall, of course, had the benefit of hindsight and knew that the 
Newtonian achievement was going to be based on assuming that free fall, and numerous 
other phenomena, could be explained in terms of a force of attraction operating at a distance 
(an idea which Westfall says «ultimately did function as midwife to the birth of 
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mechanics»
62
). It may have seemed to Westfall, therefore, that Galileo simply made an 
unfortunate error of judgement. It seems clear, however, that Galileo rejected the notion of 
force of attraction quite deliberately, precisely because it was occult. For Galileo, one of the 
most important aspects of kinematics was that, by excluding all concepts of force except 
force of percussion and other clearly intelligible notions of force deriving from the 
mathematical tradition of mechanics, it helped to diminish the considerable power of occult 
philosophies which were all too prevalent among would-be reformers of natural philosophy.   
 
Galileo’s Kinematics 
It may be objected to my claims that, whether Galileo avoided overt discussion of forces or 
not, the force of gravity was always there, especially when he was considering what he called 
«naturally accelerated motion». In what follows, I want to try to show that Galileo’s strategy 
in his philosophical discussions was always to set-up his discussions in such a way that force, 
including the force of gravity, was no longer relevant (or seemed no longer to be relevant) to 
the point at issue. In other words, Galileo consistently tried to write forces, including the 
force of gravity, out of his account. Before going any further, it is perhaps worth commenting 
on the fact that Galileo did not routinely talk of «acceleration due to gravity» but chose to 
speak instead of «naturally accelerated motion». As we shall see, when he finally states his 
law of free fall in the Discorsi, gravity is nowhere to be seen, and the accelerations are just 
something that naturally occur.  
 
One of the most effective ways that Galileo uses to do away with force, is by developing 
what is often referred to as «circular inertia», the notion that once moving in a circle with 
uniform speed a body will continue to so move indefinitely. Those, like Alexandre Koyré, 
                                                 
62 WESTFALL, Force in Newton’s Physics (cit. note 35), p. 264. 
 28 
who believe that Galileo seriously developed this notion in order to avoid confronting issues 
involving the physical cause of gravity, take consolation in the fact that, although Galileo’s 
thinking here is sadly inadequate, the great man at least came close to hitting upon the useful 
idea of inertia. Koyré and like-minded assessors of Galileo’s achievement tend to take at face 
value, therefore, the suggestions early on in the Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems, 
which are circumstantially supported later on in the work, that Galileo believes circular 
motion to be the only natural kind of motion and that, this being so, no explanation is needed 
as to why the planets, including the earth, continue to move in perfect circles and with 
uniform motions around the Sun. When Salviati, in the Dialogue, persuades Simplicio that a 
smooth ball of polished brass rolling on a glassy-smooth plane that is perfectly flat will 
neither speed up nor slow down, as it would if moving one way or another on an inclined 
plane, and that such a perfectly flat plane would, in fact, have to follow the curvature of the 
Earth (neither receding from nor approaching the Earth’s centre), it looks very much as 
though he is attempting to show how the earth itself can be assumed to be rolling perpetually 
around the Sun.
63
  
 
For Drake and other critics of Koyré this view seems to depend upon the assumption that 
Galileo was unaware of the details of Ptolemaic astronomy, much less the details of 
Keplerian astronomy, which undeniably showed that the planets could not be moving with 
perfectly circular and uniform motions. That Galileo could have been ignorant of the 
demands of technical astronomy is certainly unbelievable and so Drake and others have 
preferred to suppose that Galileo must have had an alternative, albeit hidden, account of the 
motion of the planets.
64
 Although Drake is forceful in his rejection of the idea of circular 
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inertia and its alleged role in accounting for planetary motions, he remains resolutely agnostic 
about alternative accounts. Rather than try to discover an alternative theory in Galileo’s 
writings, he prefers to stand by his assertion that Galileo did not indulge in providing causal 
explanations, and to insist that, if Galileo himself «did not offer a complete system of the 
universe», then «we need not construct one for him».
65
 But while other scholars might agree 
that Galileo did not offer a complete system, some nevertheless remain optimistic that it 
might be possible to glean hints from his writings about the general tendency of his thoughts.  
 
I subscribe to the Koyréan interpretation, and therefore have to try to understand how Galileo 
could claim, in the teeth of long acknowledged astronomical observations (and over twenty 
years after the appearance of Kepler’s Astronomia nova), that planets move in perfect circles 
with uniform circular motion. It seems to me that the only way we can understand this is by 
analogy with Galileo’s much cherished theory of the tides. It is evident that Galileo believed 
that his basic theory of the tides, based on the combined motions of the rotation of the Earth 
on its axis and its revolution around the Sun, in some sense went to the heart of the matter 
and revealed the essential truth of the phenomenon. Nevertheless, Galileo was also aware that 
messy physical contingencies, such as the varied depth of the seas, the surrounding 
topography which determined the orientation of the seas with regard to the motions of the 
Earth and so forth, must play a role in determining the all too varied motions of the tides. All 
of these extraneous conditions were sufficient, Galileo believed, to account for the many 
complexities and local variations in tide patterns. They should not be allowed, however, to 
mask the underlying truth about the motor of tidal movements, based on the Earth’s 
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combined motions, which Galileo had discovered (or so he believed). Similarly, Galileo must 
have assumed that the messy realities of planetary movements which had led Ptolemy to 
introduce eccentrics, epicycles and equants, and which had led Kepler to his first two laws of 
planetary motion (determining the continual acceleration and deceleration of planets on 
elliptical orbits) were contingent complexities which did not invalidate the fundamental truth 
of his account of planetary motions in terms of «circular inertia».
66
 
 
Before moving on, it is perhaps worth re-iterating the main point about «circular inertia»: it is 
held to work precisely because there is no interference from any mysterious force—as 
Galileo introduces the notion into his Dialogo he does so by writing gravity out of the story. 
Simplicio is asked to consider a sphere on a perfectly smooth indefinitely extended plain set 
at an incline, and to describe what would happen to the sphere. Simplicio has no hesitation in 
saying it would continually accelerate if left to move down the slope, and would rapidly 
decelerate to a stand-still if pushed up the slope. The crucial move comes next, when Salviati 
asks Simplicio what would happen if the indefinitely extended plane were set perfectly 
horizontally. There is no reason now why the sphere should speed up or slow down, because 
gravity has been prevented from taking part. If set in motion, the sphere will now move with 
whatever speed is imparted to it, and will do so indefinitely. It is undeniable, of course, that 
any such «horizontal» plane has to be defined in terms of a central point of gravitational 
attraction—the horizontal plane that Salviati describes, as Simplicio accepts, would be a 
smooth sphere enveloping the Earth (strictly, circumscribing the Earth’s centre of gravity). 
Galileo could not escape from this recalcitrant fact, but he could claim to have made the 
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centre of gravity irrelevant to his discussion, and to his explanation of the perpetual 
movement of the sphere. The sphere moved the way it did precisely because gravity was 
unable to affect it. Consequently, the movement of the sphere did not depend on any 
mysterious force, but merely on the fact that it was set in motion at some point by a mover. In 
modern terms it is a kinematic account, not a dynamic one. 
 
Of course, a modern reader might object that Galileo had not really removed gravity (how 
could he?), but merely countered its effects by means of the supposed indefinitely extended 
horizontal plane. For bodies to move perpetually and with uniform motions Galileo «needed 
to have them supported by imaginary planes», Koyré pointed out, «so as thereby to 
counteract the unavoidable action of gravity.»
67
 But Galileo’s thinking long preceded the 
establishment of Newton’s third law of motion (that action and reaction are equal and 
opposite), and it seems perfectly clear that Galileo regarded the horizontal planes he called 
upon to be required only by the nature of his illustrative examples (as in the case of a ship 
«having once received some impetus through the tranquil sea would move continually around 
our globe without ever stopping...».
68
 If we consider his «cosmogonical fancy», suggested in 
the First Day of the Dialogo, for example, we can see that Galileo did not consider the 
presence of a physical plane to be in any way crucial to his account of perpetual circular 
motion. When God created Jupiter, for example, Galileo supposed that  
We may say with Plato that at the beginning He gave it a straight and accelerated 
motion; and later, when it had arrived at that degree of velocity, converted its straight 
motion into circular motion whose speed thereafter was naturally uniform.
69
 
                                                 
67 KOYRÉ, Galileo Studies (cit. note 59), p. 239. 
68 OG, V, pp. 134-5; cited from DRAKE, The Concept of Inertia, in idem, Essays on Galileo and the History and 
Philosophy of Science, Volume 2, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999, p. 143. 
69 GALILEO, Dialogo (cit. note 27), p. 21, see also p. 29. 
 32 
Moreover, in his Mechanics of 1601 Galileo wrote «That heavy bodies, all external and 
adventitious impediments being removed, can be moved in the plane of the horizon by any 
minimum force.»
70
 It was the ‘plane of the horizon’ in the abstract that was crucial, not any 
physical plane. 
 
But if Galileo successfully contrives to make gravity irrelevant to his account of how the 
Earth and other planets can perpetually move around the Sun, surely he must acknowledge 
the role of gravity in free fall? Astonishingly, even here, in his discussions of what we would 
unthinkingly refer to as bodies accelerating due to gravity, Galileo still organises his accounts 
in such a way that he can avoid, or evade, consideration of gravity. 
 
Consider, for example, Galileo’s controversial account in the Dialogo of the descent of a 
weight from the top of a tower. Salviati is made to suppose that the actual trajectory of the 
descending weight might be along a vertical circle whose diameter stretches from the top of 
the tower to the centre of the Earth. The weight’s descent from the top to the bottom of the 
tower (which seems to an onlooker to follow the wall of the tower straight down) is actually 
movement along an arc of this supposed circle. It is evident from Galileo’s diagram (which 
should be consulted), and from the geometry of the set-up, where the descending weight will 
be in relation to the tower as the tower moves with the Earth, and the weight follows its 
course towards the centre of the Earth. As Galileo says, the points along the side of the tower 
corresponding to successive points of descent of the weight «become more distant from the 
top of the tower in an ever increasing proportion, and that is what makes its straight motion 
along the side of the tower show itself to be always more and more rapid.»
71
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The point of this, however, as Galileo goes on to suggest, is that what looks like accelerated 
motion (more and more rapid) is really only an illusion caused by the compounded motions 
of the Earth and of the line of descent of the weight. In fact, Galileo claims, «the body really 
moves in nothing other than a simple circular motion, just as when it rested on the tower it 
moved with a simple circular motion.» Simple circular motion is, of course, uniform circular 
motion. Consequently,  
the true and real motion of the stone is never accelerated at all, but is always equable 
and uniform. For all these arcs marked equally on the circumference CD [i.e. the 
circle drawn out by the movement of the tower as the Earth rotates], and 
corresponding arcs marked on the circumference CI [i.e. the vertical circle along 
which the stone descends], are passed over in equal times. So we need not look for 
any other causes of acceleration or any other motions, for the moving body, whether 
remaining on the tower or falling, moves always in the same manner; that is, 
circularly, with the same rapidity, and with the same uniformity.
72
 
 
Drake points out that this was presented by Galileo merely as a «bizzarria», and later 
dismissed as a «scherzo», but it is impossible to dismiss it out of hand. It seems to suggest 
that Galileo might really have believed, if only for a while, that he could explain accelerated 
motions (or explain them away) in terms of the motions of the Earth—in the same way that 
he believed he could explain the tides in terms of the motions of the Earth. As Sagredo is 
made to conclude:  
according to these considerations, straight motion goes entirely out of the window and 
nature never makes any use of it at all. Even that use which you granted to it at the 
beginning, of restoring to their places such integral, natural bodies as were separated 
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from the whole and badly disorganized, is now taken away and assigned to circular 
motion. 
Salviati, speaking as ever for Galileo, immediately responds that this would «necessarily 
follow» if the terrestrial globe had been «proved to move circularly», which he admits has not 
yet been done.
73
 
 
Another indication that Galileo took this proposal more seriously than he was willing to 
admit explicitly, is that he did not dismiss it even though he knew it did not quite fit in with 
his work on parabolic trajectories. Even in the Dialogo Salviati is made to offer a few words 
of caution: «But that the descent of heavy bodies does take place in exactly this way, I will 
not at present declare; I shall only say that if the line described by a falling body is not 
exactly this, it is very near to it.»
74
 But, more to the point, Galileo seems to suggest that he 
hoped to reconcile this proposal with parabolic (as opposed to circular) lines of descent in a 
letter he wrote to Pierre Carcavy in 1637. Carcavy had notified Galileo that Pierre Fermat, 
extending the motion of the weight to the centre of the Earth, had corrected the line of 
descent from a circle to a kind of spiral. The trajectory from the top of the tower to the 
bottom, Galileo now points out, would in fact be a «parabolic line», and this, if extended to 
the centre of the Earth, would continually depart from the Earth’s axis. After suggesting that 
Fermat’s critique might have been more damaging had he pointed this out, Galileo goes on to 
partially defend his original position: «I did at least make [the descent] to end at the centre [of 
the Earth], where I am sure projectiles would go to end...»
75
 It seems, anyway, that Galileo 
was well aware that there were problems with this scenario, and yet he chose to use it 
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anyway. The opportunity to show that it might be possible to dispose of accelerated motion 
by showing it to be an illusion caused merely by the combination of two other (circular) 
motions was just too good to pass up.
76
 
 
Stillman Drake pointed out that in his early De motu Galileo believed that acceleration was 
«evanescent and unimportant», but by 1602, when he was experimenting with pendulums and 
with bodies falling along concave surfaces, Drake supposed that Galileo must have 
recognised «the importance of acceleration».
77
 But I believe the attempt in the Dialogo to 
show that a body falling from the top of a tower on a rotating Earth might seem to accelerate 
when really it does not, shows that throughout much of his career Galileo did not completely 
concede the importance of acceleration. Be that as it may, it is certainly clear that he never 
accepted the view that acceleration was due to a mysterious force, whether called gravity or 
anything else. 
 
Although nothing corresponding to this discussion appears in the Discorsi, it is still very 
evident there that Galileo nowhere discusses gravity or any other cause of «naturally 
accelerated motion». Once again, he carefully organises the discussion throughout so that the 
cause of accelerated motions is evaded. This is very evident, for example, in the famous 
presentation of his definition of naturally accelerated motion: 
When... I observe a stone initially at rest falling from an elevated position and 
continually acquiring new increments of speed, why should I not believe that such 
increases take place in a manner which is exceedingly simple and rather obvious to 
everybody? If now we examine the matter carefully we find no addition or increment 
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more simple than that which repeats itself always in the same manner. This we readily 
understand when we consider the intimate relationship between time and motion; for 
just as uniformity of motion is defined by and conceived through equal times and 
equal spaces (thus we call a motion uniform when equal distances are traversed 
during equal time-intervals), so also we may, in a similar manner, through equal time-
intervals, conceive additions of speed as taking place without complication; thus we 
may picture to our mind a motion as uniformly and continuously accelerated when, 
during any equal intervals of time whatever, equal increments of speed are given to 
it.
78
 
 
Refusing to recognise any significant difference between uniform and accelerated motion, 
Galileo provides a kinematic definition in each case. It is Sagredo, not Salviati, who 
subsequently asks «what causes the acceleration in the natural motion of heavy bodies?», and 
who speaks of the «force of gravitation», and only Simplicio who enters into the discussion. 
When Salviati does interject it is only to curtail this discussion. It is here that the passage 
already quoted appears, in which Salviati says, «The present does not seem to be the proper 
time to investigate the cause of the acceleration of natural motion...»
79
 
 
Sagredo and Simplicio are allowed another brief exchange later when Sagredo, taking up 
Galileo’s claim that the descent of bodies along any chord of a vertical circle take the same 
time (Theorem VI, Proposition VI), envisages a continually expanding circle analogous to the 
circle caused by dropping a stone into water.
80
 The point is that radiation outwards from the 
centre of a horizontal circle, or downwards in all directions from the topmost point on the 
circumference of a vertical circle, gives rise to a series of continually expanding circles. 
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Simplicio sees this as related to the creation of the spherical universe. Once again, Salviati 
intervenes only to curtail the discussion. On this occasion, however, he does not do so 
dismissively. «I have no hesitation in agreeing with you», he says, but regards it as beyond 
their ability to understand this mystery.
81
  
 
It is worth lingering over this to consider the implications. I believe it is possible that Galileo 
did believe there was, as he made Simplicio say, «some great mystery hidden in these true 
and wonderful results». If so, he presumably believed that there was something here which 
confirmed his kinematic approach and might have enabled him to dismiss dynamic 
approaches. We can only speculate about that. However, it is worth noting that from our 
perspective we might have expected Galileo to take this line with regard to the earlier 
exchange between Sagredo and Simplicio about the cause of gravity. Galileo might have said 
words to the effect that «I have no hesitation in agreeing with you that there is a cause of 
gravity but it is beyond our ability to understand this mystery at present.» The fact that he did 
not say anything like this at this point in the discussion (on the cause of gravity), but did say 
it in response to Simplicio’s «mystery related to the creation of the universe», surely seems to 
suggest that Galileo had no patience whatsoever with talk of mysterious forces or virtues. He 
could entertain mysteries which concerned movement along chords of a circle in equal times, 
but he had no time for suggestions that there might be a force of gravitation. 
 
It is perhaps worth pointing out, also, that the most well known results of Galileo’s study of 
free fall say nothing about the cause of acceleration. The fact that the spaces covered in equal 
times starting from rest follow the sequence of the odd numbers, and the related conclusion 
that the distances covered are directly proportional to the squares of the elapsed times, tell us 
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nothing about why falling bodies accelerate. Similarly, the fact that Galileo showed that the 
acceleration had nothing to do with the weight of a body, and that all bodies fall at the same 
rate, must have strongly suggested to pre-Newtonian minds that gravity (whatever it might 
be) must be irrelevant. Galileo was perfectly correct in saying, when he wrote to Giovanni 
Battista Baliani in 1639, «I assume nothing but the definition of that motion with which I 
wish to deal, and whose events I wish to demonstrate... And premissing nothing more... I 
prove that the spaces passed... are in the squared ratio of the times...».
82
 Galileo premissed 
nothing more than motion. As Koyré rightly insisted, Galileo consistently refused «to see 
gravity as a natural quality of bodies», or «as a source or a cause of downwards motion».
83
  
 
Conclusion 
I believe that Galileo’s theory of the tides, which he arrived at around 1595, struck this latter 
day Archimedean as his own Eureka moment. It provided him with the insight that physical 
phenomena, even ones that seemed inescapably to depend upon occult forces, could in fact be 
explained only by motions, without premissing anything more. In some cases, the motions in 
question had to be compound motions deriving from the motion of the body and the motion 
of the Earth, but there was never any need to resort to forces or any other occult notions. In 
the Dialogo he tried to put his kinematics across in a bold and even blustering way, perhaps 
hoping that nobody among his readers would call his bluff. By the time he came to write the 
Discorsi, he was surely beginning to see that the theory of the tides, on which he had pinned 
so much, was no longer tenable.
84
 Even so, the tidal theory could still exert an influence on 
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other thinkers. As Wallace Hooper has recently suggested, a «history of the competing 
theories of the tides between 1590 and 1687 provides a modern reader with a pass key to the 
development of the emerging classical-mechanics-to-be over the same period.»
85
 Putting it 
more simply, I would suggest that Galileo’s kinematic account, in spite of its problems,  
played a major role in the development and up-take of the mechanical philosophy in the 
decades following its publication.  
 
Furthermore, the failure of the tidal theory was not enough to make Galileo abandon the 
principles of kinematics. In the Discorsi Galileo was perhaps less bold than he had been in 
the Dialogo, being content to show «with what ease and clearness» he could deduce «from a 
single principle the proofs of so many theorems» about the way bodies move. That single 
principle was «naturally accelerated motion» but even that was defined without recourse to 
notions of force («we may picture to our mind a motion as uniformly and continuously 
accelerated when, during any equal intervals of time whatever, equal increments of speed are 
given to it.»). It seems to me, furthermore, that Galileo did not so much develop his 
kinematics in order to defend Copernicanism; rather, he became a Copernican because he 
needed a moving Earth to help him to develop his kinematic natural philosophy. The tidal 
theory depended on a moving Earth and pointed the way to how a moving Earth might be 
implicated in other physical phenomena. The development of Galileo’s kinematics, therefore, 
led him to adopt Copernicanism, rather than the other way around. 
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According to Stillman Drake Galileo was led by his inability to define force to reject the 
pursuit of causes and to turn instead to a physics based on laws of nature.
86
 I do not think 
Galileo abandoned attempts to explain things in causal terms. On the contrary, his kinematics 
was seen by him as offering far more cogent, and readily intelligible, explanations of physical 
phenomena than any of the proliferating alternative speculative natural philosophies that were 
being offered by contemporary natural philosophers. The theory of the tides provides a 
causative account in terms of the motions of the Earth; the concept of «circular inertia» 
explains how it is that the Earth and the other planets can be in perpetual motion around the 
Sun.  
 
Galileo did not reject causes, he merely rejected all occult causation. Even Drake, when 
illustrating what he took to be Galileo’s rejection of causes, cited as examples sympathy and 
antipathy «or any other occult quality», Kepler’s account of the tides, and gravity. There can 
be no doubt that Galileo was dead set against occult ideas and wanted to exclude them from 
his natural philosophy. He saw it as of the utmost importance, therefore, to exclude any 
notion of force which invoked actions at a distance, attractions, repulsions and the like, or 
which depended upon what he no doubt saw as vague and unaccountable terms like radiative 
vertues, or spheres of activity.
87
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Galileo’s view was shared by Marin Mersenne, Thomas Hobbes, and no doubt others, and it 
became increasingly influential as Cartesianism, a fully formed and entirely kinematic 
system, took hold in Northern Europe.
88
 For such thinkers the contemporary emphasis upon 
occult notions seemed philosophically unsound, methodologically unsupportable, or 
theologically dangerous. But their attitude to the occult was not shared by everyone, much 
less their attitude to force. For many, occult notions of force must have seemed potentially 
highly fruitful, and their drawbacks, such as implications that they depended upon action at a 
distance, could be seen to be overruled by taking a phenomenalist stance based on 
empiricism.
89
 Each thinker no doubt had their own reasons for accepting or rejecting different 
ideas about the nature of force, and there is surely a great deal to be learned about the culture 
of late Renaissance and early modern natural philosophy from trying to uncover what those 
reasons were.  
 
What is evident, however, is that throughout the sixteenth century reforming natural 
philosophers seemed to think that the occult held the key to finding a replacement system of 
philosophy, capable of replacing the comprehensive system of scholastic Aristotelianism. By 
the second half of the seventeenth century, however, the dominance of the mechanical 
philosophy and the continuing mathematization of the world picture, showed that things had 
dramatically changed. Natural philosophers who previously would have ignored, or paid 
scant attention to, what mathematicians were doing, now accepted that bodies in motion 
                                                 
88 WILLIAM L. HINE, “Marin Mersenne: Renaissance Naturalism and Renaissance Magic”, in BRIAN VICKERS, 
ed., Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 
165-76. There is no specific study of Hobbes’s opposition to occult ideas but he was undeniably the most 
materialistic and strictly mechanistic of the English natural philosophers, see ALAN GABBEY, et al., “New 
Doctrines of Body and Its Powers, Place and Space”, in D. GARBER and M. AYERS, eds, The Cambridge History 
of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, 2 vols, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, v. 1, pp. 553-623: 
581-4. For indications of the triumph of Cartesian anti-occultism in Continental Europe consider the famous 
objections of Huygens and Leibniz to Newton’s concept of gravity.  
89 KOYRÉ, Galileo Studies (cit. note 59), pp. 177-80; and HENRY, Occult Qualities and the Experimental 
Philosophy (cit. note 39). 
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offered much more intelligible explanations of physical phenomena than anything to be found 
in the occult sciences. Furthermore, having escaped from vague and unhelpful occult 
«explanations» of phenomena, of the kind found in Ficino, Fernel, and others, and having 
learned the lessons of kinematics, it became possible for natural philosophers to re-introduce 
forces and to turn kinematics into dynamics, as Newton and Leibniz and others were 
triumphantly to do.  
 
It cannot be said that Galileo single-handedly brought about this change, but it is even more 
impossible to deny that he was one of the major figures. No other contemporary 
mathematician commanded the attention of natural philosophers the way Galileo did, and 
none could convey the philosophical import of their approach to physical phenomena and 
physical problems with anything like the clarity and impact of Galileo’s Dialogo and 
Discorsi.
90
 In the end, then, we could say that the importance of Galilean kinematics lies not 
only in how it helps us to understand the development of modern science, but also in how an 
investigation of the reasons why Galileo preferred to develop kinematics rather than 
dynamics, helps us to understand the broader philosophical and methodological attitudes, 
assumptions, and preoccupations which formed the intellectual background to the Scientific 
Revolution. 
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90 The full story of Galileo’s impact on subsequent thinkers has yet to be told, but for a brief indication of the 
rapid diffusion of his ideas throughout Europe, see, for example, the opening remarks in ENRICO GIUSTI, A 
Master and His Pupils: Theories of Motion in the Galilean School, in PALMERINO and THIJSSEN (eds), The 
Reception of Galilean Science of Motion (cit. note 4), pp. 119-35, p.119 
